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ABSTRACT
MOVEMENTISM AND PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION
IN VENEZUELA
By
Miguel Dávila

The charismatic authority of Hugo Chávez often led analysts to affirm that the Bolivarian
Revolution was dependent on his leadership. This study attempts to assess the degree of that
dependence by examining whether the Bolivarian Revolution has institutionalized or not. Three
variables were examined: the discourse of President Chávez, the political unity of PSUV
deputies in the National Assembly, and the bypass of the electoral framework by Chávez. Two
hypotheses were then formulated. The first one stipulated that the aspects of movementism found
in the Bolivarian Revolution were relevant enough to disqualify it as an institutionalized system.
The second one stipulated that the Bolivarian Revolution had, however, made efforts to
institutionalize that qualify it as a system in transition. The revolution was found to be only
partially institutionalized as the bypass of the electoral framework by President Chávez was both
a violation of institutionalized democracy and participatory democracy. A discussion of findings
follow.
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INTRODUCTION
“Today April 19, 203 years later, we have a fatherland,”1 these were the words of
Vicepresident Arreaza the day Nicolás Maduro, the handpicked successor of President Chávez
was sworn in office after winning a hotly contested election. The date is also significant because
203 years ago, on April 19, Venezuela began its path towards independence from the Spanish
crown. Venezuela was the first country in IberoAmerica to officially begin the independence
movement with the destitution of the Spanish governor in Caracas and the creation of an
independent government council. “Fifteen years ago, we were a neocolony. Thank you,
comandante! We won’t disappoint you!” proclaimed Vicepresident Arreza, attributing a new
form of independence to President Chávez and his administration. Indeed, Venezuelan politics
had a very different dynamic just fifteen years ago when the system that had prevailed since
1958 collapsed. This new independence could be related to the dismissal of the neoliberal
policies that were implemented in Latin America for three decades (Murray, Cameron, and
Hershberg 1), or it could also be related to one of the main premises of the Bolivarian
Revolution: empoderamiento, or empowerment (Levine 178). These practices of empowerment
have had a significant effect in Venezuelan politics, having the successes of the Bolivarian
Revolution be dependent on the mobilization of popular sectors and their organization
(McCarthy 123).
Similarly to the independence movement in 1810, Venezuela was once again the pioneer
of this newer form of independence that sought to empower those who have been marginalized
by rejecting the neoliberal policies dictated by the Washington Consensus.2 The election of

1

“Vicepresidente Arreaza: Hoy 19 de abril, 203 años después, tenemos patria.” VTV www.vtv.gob.ve
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President Chávez in 1998 revived the left in Latin America. Subsequent to his election, a trend
towards the left began to form, first with the election of Lagos in Chile in 2000, then with the
election of Lula da Silva in Brazil. And with the elections of Kirchner and Vasquez in Argentina
and Uruguay respectively, the trend got accentuated. By the end of the decade, the left had
conquered important political spaces in almost every country in Latin America (Murray,
Cameron, and Hershberg 2). Although these left turns in Latin America, now called “the pink
tide,” have had similar backgrounds and goals, they have nonetheless been unique to every
country. Yet the one thing they have in common besides antineoliberalism and empowerment is
the figure of Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution as the pioneer. His policies have been
followed by many governments in Latin America, especially in Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador,
governments that represent a more radical left turn (Castañeda and Morales 10). Considering
these premises, it is then easy to understand why the streets of Caracas were filled with
thousands of people mourning their leader after his death on March 5, 2013. Chávez was a
popular but controversial figure both in Venezuela and elsewhere. For more than fifteen years,
winning almost every single election in the country, Chávez led both his country and the
revolutionary left in Latin America. However, considering the cult of personality that was
denounced by the opposition in Venezuela and in other countries, the media often played with
the possibility of the extinction of chavismo once Chávez was gone. While this was not the case
in the most recent presidential election of April 14, 2013, Chavismo without Chávez has been
severely weakened. The candidate chosen by Hugo Chávez to succeed him was not able to

Term refers to the neoliberal policies by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury
that sought to reinforce free market policies, strengthening the private sector, liberalization of trade, and reduction of
government intervention (Smith, 14).
2
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conquer as many votes as Chávez had in October 2012, and this loss almost resulted in the
election of opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski.
One of the reasons why Chavismo may have been weakened in such a short period of
time may be due to movement politics, the topic that was studied thoroughly in this paper. One
of the key characteristics of a political movement is the direct appeal of the masses from the
leader, which increases the likelihood for parties to weaken and populism to rise as an alternative
(Mainwaring and Scully 22). These direct appeals of the masses, sometimes in the form of
plebiscitary governments, can be reflections of a system where the party is not valuable
(McGuire 1), and this may result in political instability.
Definition of political movements and political parties
A key element in describing the stability of democracies is the nature of the political
parties that form the system. These political parties can either be institutionalized or not, and in
many cases, the reason why some political parties haven’t been institutionalized is because they
have remained political movements. While remaining a political movement can be very
problematic for the stability of democracy, institutionalizing a political party is also a complex
process that can take a long time. After all, one of the main premises to conclude whether a
political party is institutionalized or not is that it must have stable roots in society (Mainwaring
1). However, there are more issues that go beyond attaining stable roots in society. A political
movement, as it is described by McGuire, is “a set of people who share a common political
identity and whose leaders aspire to full and permanent control of the state through the most
readily available means, electoral or not” (McGuire 7). In this sense, a political movement can
indeed establish a common political identity with society, an important indicator to predict
whether any political organization will be successful at attaining and maintaining control of the
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government. Yet being in control of government is not an indication of party institutionalization,
it is rather an indication of party strength.
To discuss the differences between party institutionalization and party strength, it is
important to introduce McGuire’s definition of a political party. In his work titled “Peronism
without Perón,” he refers to a political party as “an organization whose leaders and members
seek to control the state exclusively through elections involving competition with other parties
(7).” It must be noted that McGuire excludes the sharing of a common political identity as an
indicator of an institutionalized political party. This is precisely because the establishment of a
common political identity between society and a political organization may describe the level of
success and strength that an organization has in controlling the state, but it does not reflect its
level of institutionalization. There are two key differences between a political party and a
political movement. The first one is whether the political process is viewed as a competition with
other actors, and the second one is whether the means used to seek control are purely electoral or
not. Furthermore, a political movement does not put the party in the center of the political
process. Instead, leaders become the center of the process (Mainwaring and Scully 3). An
institutionalized political party is, by this definition, clearly more committed to democracy in the
sense that it does not seek to abolish the principles of competition and plurality. It is also more
democratic in the sense that it does not consider non electoral means to attain power. However,
the same way that party strength should not be equated to institutionalization, political
movementism should not be equated to a lack of democracy either (Mainwaring 21).
Why Institutionalize?
The type of political movement that I studied in this paper is that of a leadercentered
movement. Political parties, in many regions of the world, can often begin to join the political
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arena as small movements under the strong leadership of an individual. However, political
parties are expected to evolve and institutionalize so that elections are organized around these
parties and not individuals. This process, as Samuel Huntington argues, is necessary so that the
political organizations that seek to control the state “acquire value and stability (Mainwaring and
Scully 4).” Mainwaring argues that in countries where democracy is not consolidated, political
parties do not shape and influence system. They are rather personalistic, dependent on the
ambitions of a leader (Mainwaring 3). And while having an institutionalized political party does
not immediately translate to having a more efficient democracy, an institutionalized political
party is far better than a political movement, or an “inchoate party” because it makes politics
more predictable and, therefore, stable. Avoiding an inchoate party system, where dominant
parties are not institutionalized, Mainwaring proceeds, is also important because less
institutionalization sets the arena for populists to ascend to power. As a consequence, a scenario
where policies are pursued to seek publicity instead of longterm impacts is far more common
(Mainwaring 22).
To summarize, the key issue with having a political party that is inchoate or not
institutionalized is that it severely affects the political stability of a state. Democracy may also be
affected, but that would essentially be due to instability. There may also be a high risk of
dependency when a leadercentered movement is in power. Considering the relevance of
defining the level of institutionalization in the sense that it enhances the stability and
predictability of a democratic political system, the purpose of this study is to examine the process
by which a leadercentered mass movement transforms or evolves into an institutionalized
political party, a process called routinization (McGuire 16). Like McGuire and Mainwaring,
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however, my study does not seek to determine whether a particular party is completely
institutionalized or not. It merely seeks to place a party in the continuum of routinization.
The case of Venezuela: Institutionalization and Puntofijismo
Officially renamed “the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” under the constitution of 1999,
the Venezuelan case under the Hugo Chávez’s regime provides an excellent opportunity to study
the process of routinization. However, in order to better evaluate routinization during the
Bolivarian Revolution, it is important to discuss what democracy was like in Venezuela before
1999.
Prior to the presidency of Hugo Chávez, it had remained a stable, bipartisan democracy since
1958 (Smilde 3). Subsequent to the overthrow of the Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in 1958,
three national political parties negotiated a pact in which they would commit to democracy and
institutionalization. The three parties were Acción Democrática (AD), founded as a social
democratic party, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), a social
Christian party, and Union Republicana Democrática (URD), a less moderate leftist party. The
pact of Punto Fijo signed by these three parties not only ensured that the three parties committed
to electoral means to attain power, it also excluded several actors from the entire political system
(Smilde 3). The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), for example, was excluded from the
pact. A few years after the pact was signed, Union Republicana Democratica (URD) also decided
to leave the pact, which strengthened both COPEI and AD to the extent in which some scholars
have labeled the Punto Fijo system as a partidocracia or “partyocracy.” Actors from the
traditional right were excluded, too, however. As landowners and powerful elites became
associated with the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez, the new system would ensure that their
involvement in politics was limited. Among many other means3, some of which may even
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include fraud, this partidocracia equally divided power between the two parties by making
immediate reelection to public office impossible under the 1961 constitution.
While the Punto Fijo framework ensured stability, it also created an accountability problem
that some scholars have labeled as one of the main reasons why the system eventually collapsed
in 1999 (Crisp13). To describe the extent to which public officials in Venezuela were not
accountable, it is important to discuss how relatively weak the legislative branch was. Important
economic decisions were not voted in Congress. A small group of people who were unknown to
the Venezuelan public made the decisions, and the president, as a result, courted the interests of
the small group instead of appealing to the Venezuelan population. This small group was
composed of three highrank executive officials, one representative from private enterprises, and
another one from organized labor (Crisp 2). Besides this group, oil multinationals also exerted
some control over the country as they benefited more from the oil industry than Venezuelans did.
Although national resources weren’t necessarily equally distributed, the Punto Fijo system
employed clientelism and populism in order to retain control of the nation. Power was distributed
in accordance to the election results, but the party who lost was never disenfranchised. If AD
won an election, the public services were distributed widely to Copeyanos too, and many of the
governmental positions were retained by the losing party in order to continue the balance.
(Smilde 3; Hillman 59). Although it was highly unaccountable, the system may have lasted
several decades because it did have important accomplishments. Social and economic progress
was made during the first half of the pact, and democracy was legitimized by high participation
levels in elections (Cannon 35). The weaknesses of the Punto Fijo system were a lack of
accountability, predominance of elite control, and, most importantly, the fact that parties became
The ability limitations to choose all local and national representatives, a strict party hierarchy, and the creation of
clientelistic networks are some of the other means (Smilde 3).
3
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so strong and institutionalized that, instead of shaping the system, they dominated it in its
entirety. It is also important to mention that, as economic challenges began to threaten stability,
AD and COPEI were not willing to change in accordance to the changes that the Venezuelan
population was going through (Levine 171). Venezuelans, under diminishing economic
conditions in the 1980s, began to make new demands that would address the weaknesses of the
Punto Fijo system, but by the time the parties began to make some reforms, the system was
already collapsing.
The case of Venezuela: Collapse of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chávez
Once oil prices began to plummet, so did the incomes and living standards of most
Venezuelans. The government then responded by making the executive stronger to resolve the
crisis. In 1984, 160 out of the 180 laws approved by Congress were drafted by the President. The
next year, President Lusinchi issued more than 70 decrees to rescue the economy by refinancing
public debt and cutting public spending. Other decrees were issued to establish different rates for
the national currency and accumulate foreign exchange. However, the increased power of the
executive only served the purpose of reinforcing the model of import substitution
industrialization that was already failing in Venezuela (Crisp 2). Due to the lack of
improvements, a “civil society” emerged, and protests became common occurrences. In 1989,
however, when President Carlos Andres Pérez implemented even harsher economic reforms that
included a reduction of oil subsidies, the demands to “democratize democracy” intensified to the
level where government and profound institutional change were needed (Garcia 34). In addition,
citizens in Caracas took the streets and rioted in February 1989, events that took the lives of
hundreds of people (Smilde 6). Three years after El Caracazo, the demands reached a higher
level in the 1992 attempt to overthrow the Pérez government. Led by then Colonel Hugo Chávez,
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MBR200 (Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario200) realized that the political turmoil the
country was living was a good opportunity to implement some of the goals they had established
when the movement was founded in 1983. The coup ultimately failed, but it served to launch
Chávez’s career as a national leader who “stirred popular hope that the struggle had only begun”
(Hellinger 32). Subsequently, the popularity of Chávez and MBR200 kept rising due to the
Venezuelan government’s refusal to implement the reforms that were needed to restore stability.
The government made efforts to decentralize, but the parties had already been severely
weakened by MBR200. Other parties outside the Punto Fijo system began to win important
mayoral offices and governorships, but MBR200 maintained a low profile since it was more
concerned with fighting institutions then participating within them (Lopez Maya 78). MBR200
was also viewed negatively by other leftist parties due to the rhetoric and leadership of Hugo
Chávez, which could also explain why the movement was not visible for a few years (Sanchez
Urribarri 176). In 1997, MBR200 senior officials, Chávez being one of them, changed their
mind about the democratic process, and announced that they would participate in the 1998
election. As a result, they formed the electoral party that would replace MBR200, called MVR
(Fifth Republic Movement), and registered Chávez as their candidate. The new organization
remained loyal to the initial proposal of MBR200 to radically change the Venezuelan political
system by forming a new republic with a different set of values, but they also retained much of
the organization and structure of a political movement (Lopez Maya 82). Chávez, as the only
figure who represented real change from the status quo in 1998, won the national election with
56.20% of the national vote, more than 15 points ahead of the second best contender Henrique
Salas Römer, and has won almost every single national election since then. Shortly after the
1998 election, the Chávez administration proposed a referendum to ask Venezuelans whether
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they wanted to abolish the old system of government and have a new constitution. The proposal,
although it had very low turnout, was approved by the people. A Constituent Assembly was
formed to draft a new constitution and form a new republic. This abolished the branches of
government in the old republic, and the another presidential election was held to give legitimacy
to the process. Chávez won this election comfortably, and it is from this election that the number
of presidential periods is counted.
Although he remained a very popular figure for most of his presidency, Chávez faced
plenty of challenges coming from the opposition. A couple of years after a new constitution was
drafted and approved by the people on the principles of participatory democracy, the opposition
orchestrated a coup d’état that abolished the new constitution and attempted to return to
Puntofijismo. Chávez was indeed removed from the executive for a couple of days, but returned
after people in the barrios mobilized and surrounded the Miraflores palace demanding his return
(Dominguez 121). That same year in 2002, the opposition attempted once again to remove
Chávez from office. This time by paralyzing the entire economy through an oil strike that lasted
a few months and may have cost the country over 700,000 jobs (Britto Garcia 151). The strategy
was again defeated by the government, but the opposition had not given up. In 2004, they
collected signatures to request the recall of President Chávez under article 74 of the 1999
constitution. As enough signatures were collected to request the removal, a new election was
held. Yet Chávez was able to remain in office with more than 59% of the vote in his favor.4
Realizing that a major defeat in the legislative elections was very likely, the opposition decided
to boycott the entire election process on the basis that the National Electoral Council was

4

National Electoral Council (CNE) www.cne.gob.ve
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fraudulent (Dominguez 124). Evidently, this resulted in a National Assembly that was 100%
Chavista.
After a series of consecutive defeats, the opposition began to change their strategy by
participating in the new institutional framework. They unified in the 2006 presidential election
and proposed Governor Manuel Rosales of Zulia as their single candidate. Chávez won the
election with a 30point margin, and Manuel Rosales recognized the results publicly and
accepted the defeat. In 2007, the opposition begins to gain a series of important victories. First
with the defeat of the 2007 constitutional reform that sought to transform Venezuela into a
socialist state, then in 2008 by winning the governorships of the most important states including
the Capital District of Caracas, and finally in the 2010 legislative election when the opposition
broke the PSUV’s absolute majority. In 2012, a new presidential election was held, and the
opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski was defeated by 10point margin as President
Chávez won his third reelection under the 1999 constitution.5
Two months after the election, on December 8, 2012, President Chávez announced on
live television that he needed to return to Cuba to continue his medical treatment for the cancer
that he had been diagnosed with in 2011. Although Venezuelans had gotten used to the constant
trips Chávez was making due to his cancer, he had said he was cured months before, and actively
participated in campaign rallies to disqualify the rumors that were coming from the opposition in
regards to his deteriorated health. More surprising was the fact that he addressed the possibility
of not being able to return to Venezuela in good condition. He also asked Venezuelans to vote
for Nicolás Maduro, the vicepresident, in the event that new elections needed to be called. On
March 5, 2013, Chávez died in Caracas, an event that not only propelled thousands of

5
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Venezuelans to massively take the streets to mourn their leader, but it also activated a very
particular constitutional process. Under the Venezuelan constitution, in the event that a president
dies in office, the vice president must become the interim president until a new presidential
election is performed, which must be within 30 days after the president’s death (Art 263).
Following this logic, Nicolás Maduro was sworn in as interim president, and shortly after, the
National Electoral Council (CNE) announced that the new presidential elections would be on
April 14, 2013. As it was expected by most analysts, the two major contenders were Henrique
Capriles Radonski and Interim President Nicolás Maduro. At the time of writing, Venezuela
seems to be immerged in a political crisis as the narrow win by the now proclaimed President
Maduro is contested by the opposition.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Venezuelan politics had been a controversial subject both in Venezuela and abroad for
the last fifteen years or so. While many authors have now become interested in the Bolivarian
Revolution, they don’t reach any consensus on almost any of the levels of discussion. The wide
range of opinions and studies make it possible to find both extremely favorable and unfavorable
assessments. This is due to the fact that the level of polarization lived in Venezuela has
transcended to the academic literature (Hawkins 26). BrewerCarías, for example, finds that the
Chávez administration has constantly defrauded the constitution by implementing a highly
authoritarian system that centralizes and makes all the public powers subject to the executive
(BrewerCarías 25). Levine is a proponent of the idea of “new face, same dependencies,” in
which he denounces how Chávez has made the popular sectors be dependent upon him. He
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argues that the Punto Fijo system has been replicated by Chávez (Levine 180). In regards to
movementism, SánchezUrribarri finds that the entire Venezuelan left is subject to President
Chávez and not the other way around, a risk for the stability of the state. Furthermore, he argues
that Chávez’s “movement” constantly refrains from sharing power (SanchezUrribarri 191).
Hawkins also labels Chavismo as essentially a “populist movement” that is semi democratic and
disregards pluralism (Hawkins 15). On the other side of the spectrum, authors like Cannon find
that a disregard for institutionalization may have been necessary in a country like Venezuela to
pursue social justice (Cannon 169). Baxton, another proponent of this view, adds that the authors
who label Bolivarian Venezuela as antidemocratic or as a system lacking institutionalization are
neglecting the fact that the Bolivarian Revolution seeks to break preconceived notions of
democracy. Therefore, new, alternative means to examine it should be developed (Buxton 11).
The more proBolivarian authors like Smilde and Hellinger also believe the grassroots aspect of
the revolution has yet to be institutionalized. However, they praise the levels of legitimacy that
the system has while agreeing with Baxton in saying that our notions of institutionalization and
civil society are not up to date with the changes that are occurring in Venezuela (Smilde 1224;
Hellinger 341).
Bolivarian Discourse
One of the aspects of the Bolivarian Revolution that was examined in this study is the
discourse of President Chávez. Although the findings by Hawkins relate to populism and not to
movementism, his findings are nonetheless very relevant for my study. He found that Chávez
used a very populist discourse that was easily comparable to the discourse of other populist
leaders. In that comparison, however, Hawkins found that Chávez engaged in this type of
discourse far more often. Finally, the populist aspect of Chávez’s discourse that was most
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repeated was the “Good vs. Evil.” This type of discourse consisted in making the opponent seem
evil, oligarchic and elitist, while he represented the good and the will of the people (Hawkins
82).
Bypass of the Electoral Framework
Another author’s analysis that was very useful as a reference in this study was the one by
BrewerCarías in regards to the constitutional reform of 2007. He found that many of the
constitutional reforms that were rejected by the Venezuelan people have been implemented in
Venezuela mainly by three different means: legislation via decrees by President Chávez,
legislation in the National Assembly, and judicial interpretation. The author considers these
implementations as fraudulent since the constitution prohibits the implementation of laws that
have been rejected in popular consultation (BrewerCarías 329). His analysis is useful because it
recognizes the complexity of these implementations. It is particularly difficult to trace most of
them because of different reasons. Some laws had different names, others were implemented
partially by one branch without enacting any law, and others were attached to other bigger laws,
which made them unnoticeable (BrewerCarías 333). Moreover, a few laws were also
implemented even before the full project was submitted for popular consultation (BrewerCarías
330).

METHODOLOGY
Purpose of the Study
Although the main figure behind the Bolivarian Revolution has died, questions in regards to
the level of institutionalization that el proceso has accomplished become more relevant than
ever, and Venezuela provides an even greater opportunity to study the evolution of movement
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politics. As discussed, the Bolivarian Revolution began as a movement in the form of MBR200.
Since then, the parties that have supported Hugo Chávez have attempted to distance themselves
from movement politics by unifying first into the MVR, and then into the PSUV (Unified
Socialist Party of Venezuela). Other efforts to institutionalize the movement include the holding
of primaries to choose candidates for the legislative elections in 2010, and even a tweet on
President Chávez’s Twitter account where he confirmed he had spoken to his contender Capriles
Radonski after his defeat to encourage unity in Venezuela.6 The most important indicator of
institutionalization in the PSUV is the fact that Venezuela has held multiple elections in the last
15 years, several of them being referenda. The idea of democracia participativa that Chávez had
championed well at least in the increasing number of elections and referenda since 1998 does
definitely give the Bolivarian Revolution a high level of legitimacy for many authors and, most
importantly, for most Venezuelans too. However, Chávez’s charisma and populist rhetoric that
had worried the Venezuelan left in the 1990s continued to be present in el proceso, and that,
among many other factors, has led some analysts to argue that the left in Venezuela had become
dependent upon Hugo Chávez.
This study attempts to assess that level of dependency of the left on Chávez by studying
the degrees of institutionalization in the Bolivarian Revolution mainly through studying the
PSUV. A high degree of movementism would suggest that the Revolution is still leadercentered,
and a high level of institutionalization would suggest that the Revolution has established roots in
society that are far beyond the figure of President Chávez. Two questions are then formulated:
What aspects of movementism are still present in the Revolution? To answer this question, the
definition of a political movement used above was broken up in two factors. The first factor is

6
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the degree to which the Revolution seeks to control the state via nonelectoral means and the
extent to which the Revolution accepts competition with other parties as a legitimate power
game. The next factor is whether the movementist aspects of the Revolution are sufficient to
impede the process of routinization. In order to answer this question, the four criteria established
by Mainwaring in terms of what constitutes an institutionalized political party would be
considered. These criteria are:
1. Stability in the rules and nature of interparty competition
2. Establishment of stable roots in society
3. Elections as the primary route to governing
4. Party organization that is independent of ambitious leaders7
Before discussing the different variables that were employed, it is important to discuss
the problems that may arise when studying a country undergoing such important political and
social changes like Venezuela. It has been argued that measuring and studying Venezuelan
democracy according to world standards is difficult due to the fact that one of the major premises
of the Bolivarian Revolution is to implement a new form of democracy that replaces the notions
of representative democracy with participatory democracy. It has also been argued that, even
before the Bolivarian Revolution, Venezuelan democracy has always been full of particularities
since, as a petrostate, the Venezuelan government has been expected to exert a higher level of
control in society in order to distribute the oil revenues (Hellinger 164165). AD and COPEI,
although being highly institutionalized, held a tight control over society to impede other actors
from participating in the democratic process too. Another fact that makes the Venezuelan case
problematic is that the polarization that exists in Venezuelan society for more than a decade has
Mainwaring, Scott, and Scully, Timothty. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Page
5
7
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transcended to the academic literature. To overcome these challenges, this study has attempted to
focus on the Venezuelan context. By discussing how the Punto Fijo system operated and how the
opposition in Venezuela operates now, this study also seeks to explain the uniqueness of the
Bolivarian Revolution. While all the variables studied are applicable to all democracies, the
discussion of the results and implications are applicable to the model that has been established in
Venezuela, which is the model of participatory democracy. The variable in regards to the bypass
of electoral framework, for example, was specifically examined in the context of Venezuela. An
emphasis has been placed on elections and popular participation, and considering the changes
that Venezuela has been experiencing, a bypass of the electoral framework may be more
problematic there than in a nation with the standard representative democracy.
My contribution to the scholarly work is not found in making a comparison between the
Bolivarian and the Punto Fijo model in regards to which one is more democratic since defining
democracy is problematic both in Venezuela and elsewhere. Furthermore, it may be argued that
the Bolivarian model has attempted to create more spaces for civil society to emerge and be less
dependent upon institutions. One of these spaces is the communal council, a citizenformed
assembly that seeks to ensure the wellbeing of the community to which they belong by
becoming more independent from government entities. In reality, the communal councils are
closely tied to the executive, which suggests that the patterns of clientelism from the Fourth
Republic have not disappeared (Hellinger 165). Other policies that have been implemented by
the national government, such as the social missions to improve living standards and empower
individuals, also have a topdown quality to them (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 211). In this
sense, discussions about institutionalism are still relevant because the parallel spaces that have
been created do not undermine the nature of the typical political process where parties are

21

essential. The means to empower citizens are very dependent upon the executive to be
considered fully institutionalized in their own realm. For this reason, my contribution is focused
on empirically assessing whether the Bolivarian model has successfully made the transition from
a political movement to a political party. Movementism, as McGuire has argued, is indeed very
damaging to democracy, but this does not necessarily mean that the system is entirely
undemocratic. Henceforth, I avoided engaging in extensive discussions about the effects of
movementism on Venezuelan democracy. I did, however, measure the effects that the elements
of movementism have on the party’s effort to institutionalize.
The Venezuelan case, although both atypical and difficult to measure in many areas, still
relies on regular party competition in order to assert control of the country, which makes the
measurement of the research question not only possible in a polarized context, but also necessary
in order to assess the efficiency of the PSUV in a democracy. My initial argument is that the
elements of movementism that are present in the party have indeed harmed its ability to become
an institutionalized political party. While the party members do share a common set of values,
which according to McGuire, is an important indicator of strength, my argument is that Chávez’s
charismatic authority remains the most important force within the party, and perhaps even within
the entire political system in Venezuela. Charisma “is a type of authority based on the shared
belief that a certain person has extraordinary insight into the right way to live and to organize the
community” (McGuire 15). Even after his death, Chávez’s voice was heard in the most recent
Maduro campaign rallies as enthusiasts hold posters with Chávez’s face on it. When he was
alive, he controlled the party to a great extent. Even when the party sought to institutionalize by
holding primaries and holding citizen assemblies to nominate candidates, Chávez usually had the
last say. During a rally in the state of Carabobo in August, 2012, Chávez publicly announced his
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decision to make Ameliach replace Maduro as a candidate for the state governorship in the
elections to be held December 2012. The public at the rally clearly protested this decision, to
which Chávez responded almost aggressively, “What’s at stake here is the October 7th election
[in reference to the presidential election]… This is not about a particular face or about Ameliach.
I have said it: Ameliach will be the candidate for the state of Carabobo!”8 Instances like these,
where Chávez took a very personal approach to politics, were not uncommon in his
administration.
Relevance of the Research Question
In the Venezuelan context, studying the level of institutionalism in a political party as
powerful as the PSUV is extremely relevant now that President Chávez has died. Prior to his
death, the highly personalistic ways in which Chávez governed were criticized by both the left
and right in Venezuela and elsewhere. The charisma and leadership of President Chávez was
often cited as one of the many factors that explained the accomplishments of the Bolivarian
Revolution. If Chávez was so essential to the development of the party, then, by definition, the
party may be forced to speed up its process of routinization now that he is not present. If the
process of routinization has not been successful in the past years, then it can be argued that the
party could face important challenges to secure control of the state. So far, it seems like the
leadership of the PSUV is purposely trying to keep politics Chávezcentered to face those
challenges. Although this strategy may work due to the fact that the PSUV is indeed a very
strong party, the current events continue to be vital to study movement politics. If political
parties are not institutionalized and remain political movements, the democracy in which they
participate is highly unpredictable, which diminishes stability. In this sense, studying
“Chávez names Amerliach as Candidate in Carabobo, substituting Maduro.” (El Universal, 5 August 2012). The
statement’s translation to English is my own.
8
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institutionalization in the PSUV is not only important to define the challenges that the Bolivarian
Revolution may face now that Chávez is gone, but also to study the challenges that the entire
democratic system in Venezuela may encounter if routinization is not completed.
These questions in regards to the institutionalization of the PSUV are extremely relevant
in a Latin American context. For many years, South America has been ruled by neoliberal
governments who had very close ties to the socalled Washington Consensus. It isn’t until 1998,
with the rise of Hugo Chávez as a potential winner for the presidential election in Venezuela that
a new left begins to emerge. This is not to say that this new left is uniform all across South
America, now a continent where the majority of the states have governments with leftist sets of
values. The new Left may be viewed on a continuum, where Chávez in Venezuela, Morales in
Bolivia, and Correa in Ecuador would be placed in the radical left, the Kirchners in Argentina
somewhere in the middle, and Lula in Brazil would be placed in the more conservative or
pragmatic end of the spectrum (Morales and Castañeda 10). Although these governments are
different in how they approach local issues, they have all distanced themselves from the
Washington Consensus by either rejecting the neoliberal framework in its entirety or by rejecting
it partially. Conservative or radical, the influence that Chávez had on the new left as its pioneer
cannot be ignored. Politics in Latin America, especially in countries like Bolivia and Ecuador,
has changed dramatically after the rise of Chávez. His model of participatory democracy has
been employed in Ecuador and Bolivia extensively. Therefore, at least for these two states that
have modeled their systems after the Venezuelan one, there could also be a risk of dependency
upon leaders, which may lead to instability.
The influence and political leadership that Venezuela had in the region during the Chávez
era also makes the question of institutionalism for states outside of the region very important.
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The WashingtonCaracas relations saw very difficult times in the Chávez administration as
Chávez’s Socialism of the XXI Century threatened the neoliberal model and some free market
policies that the US sought to implement in Latin America for most of the last century. Most
states in South America have reformed the way they handle their diplomatic and political
relations with the United States. It can be argued that Chávez was one of the leaders that created
a network of support in the region for decisions that asserted the different states’ sovereignty and
independence. As US military bases were closed in Ecuador, and as the entire region has moved
towards encouraging closer relations with Cuba, it is clear that South America was
fundamentally changed by Hugo Chávez’s leadership. Assessing how stable the Bolivarian
Revolution is now that Chávez has died is of vital importance to the US if it seeks to have better
relations with the entire region.
Measures
Bolivarian Discourse
Since Chávez’s discourse has become essential to the Bolivarian Revolution (Hawkins 50
63), it was an important variable in order to assess how the Bolivarian Revolution views the
other sectors that participate in the political process. It is also important to examine Chávez’s
discourse in regards to the other factor that is evaluated in this study, which is the level in which
the Bolivarian Revolution is committed to elections as a means to control the state. If these two
factors, which represent a lack of commitment with the democratic process in the sense that it is
nonelectoral and disregards competition, are present, then it can be said that the Bolivarian
Revolution has a movementist discourse. President Chávez, as the main leader of the movement
and former president of the PSUV, had a very clear control over the party. Chávez’s personal
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views have often been reiterated by other PSUV elected officials, which is another indicator of
how influential Chávez’s discourse was for the movement.
From January 2009 until January 2011, Chávez wrote a series of columns that were
published online in the PSUV official website as well as in several proBolivarian newspapers.
These were usually published Tuesdays, Thursdays, and/or Sundays, but did not follow a strict
publication schedule. “Las Lineas de Chávez,” as they were titled, were very personal and
discussed several different and unrelated themes in one single publication. The 104 articles that
were available online were enumerated. Then, I proceeded to examine which articles were
written during campaign periods and excluded those articles. In Venezuela, campaign periods
have a start and end date that is officially set by a government body called the National Electoral
Council (CNE). Depending on the election, these official campaign periods can last anywhere
from a couple of weeks to three months. From January 2009 until January 2011, two major
elections took place in Venezuela: The referendum of February 2009 to amend the constitution
and make reelections of public officials unlimited, and the legislative elections of September
2010. The campaign periods for these elections were one month and two months respectively.
Verifying the official start and end dates on CNE’s official website, the articles written by
Chávez during these periods (a total of 9) were excluded. From the remaining 95 articles, a
random sample of 12 articles was chosen by using a random number generator online. In this
portion, these 12 articles were looked at to see what type of language President Chávez used
when referring to the opposition in Venezuela. The two most important factors being examined
here are the two related to McGuire’s definition of movementism: disregard of competition with
other political sectors and a lack of commitment with the electoral process. It also relates to
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Mainwaring’s first requirement for an institutionalized political party, which is stability in the
rules and nature of interparty competition.
PSUV Vote Share in the National Assembly
The second subject that must be discussed relates directly with the second requirement of an
Institutionalized political party, which is the establishment of stable roots in society. To measure
this stability of the Bolivarian Revolution, grouping all the parties that have supported el proceso
at a given point, this part of the study examined the changes in the composition of the National
Assembly during three different constitutional periods. These are 20012006, 20062011, and
20112016. What is being evaluated here is a change of political sides, or an increase or decrease
of vote share for the PSUV in the National Assembly after the deputies had been elected.
The number of deputies that have switched political sides were compared from period to
period in an attempt to find whether these political switches have become more or less common
in recent years. Beyond discussion and comparison of the raw numbers at the National
Assembly, this section also mentions the cases of several governors who have also switched
from proBolivarian to antiBolivarian. Finally, this section also discusses the Ley
Antitalanquera, which punishes deputies who change their political ideology after being elected.
A talanquera is essentially a wall, but saltar la talanquera, which means to jump over the wall,
has become a wellknown Venezuelan phrase to describe politicians who change ideologies after
they have been elected. La Ley Antitalanquera, then, seeks to punish these deputies in order to
stop the practice from continuing. If there has been a reduction in the practice from period to
period, then it can be argued that the Bolivarian Revolution is more committed to
institutionalization as it has evolved over time.
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Bypass of the Electoral Framework
In Latin America, the practice of governing by presidential decrees is wellknown and
used by many presidents. In the case of Venezuela in the Punto Fijo system, the legislative body
of government was almost powerless due to the fact that decrees had stronger implications in
Venezuelan society than laws voted on in the legislature. Under the current system, the
Venezuelan Constitution gives the Executive an ability to legislate over a specific period of time
in all the areas that he may find pertinent. The constitution establishes that decree laws or
habilitantes are to be approved by 3/5 of the National Assembly. This qualified majority also has
to determine which areas the President would be able to legislate on and for how long (Art 203).
President Chávez used this power three times to legislate before, and although the opposition
sectors have claimed the habilitantes or decrees are unconstitutional, it is a practice that’s not
uncommon in Latin America, therefore its nature won’t necessarily be discussed to a great
extent. However, responding to other types of claims that the opposition has made towards the
habilitantes, this part of the study examined if there’s an overlap between the decrees that
President Chávez made in 2008 and the proposal to modify the constitution of 2007. The
proposal, which intended to give more power to the people through stronger community
organization and by socializing the economy further, was rejected by a narrow margin in 2007.
An attempt from President Chávez to bypass that fundamental electoral defeat to make sure the
constitutional reform would still be implemented would certainly be a disregard of the electoral
process. In a state where referenda has been a common practice in the last 15 years because of
the idea to move towards a more direct, participatory democracy, ignoring electoral results can
be vital in determining whether the government is committed to institutionalization or not.
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Research Question and Hypotheses
The main research question of this study is: Has the Bolivarian Revolution routinized?
That is, has the movement become an institutionalized political party mainly through the PSUV
and other major political parties? Two hypotheses in regards to the matter were also formulated.
The first one is that the aspects of movementism that are present within the Bolivarian
Revolution are relevant enough to disqualify el proceso as an institutionalized system with
institutionalized parties. The second hypothesis is that, while the Revolution may not be
institutionalized, the successes it has had in institutionalizing itself may describe it as a system in
transition, a system that may be struggling with institutionalization, but has had important
accomplishments in the area.

RESULTS
Bolivarian Discourse
As was mentioned in the methodology section, movementist discourse can be of two
kinds: either disregarding elections as the only way to control the state or disregarding the other
political players as legitimate competitors. From the sample of twelve articles, Chávez
mentioned the opposition in one way or another in ten of them. Out of these ten articles, Chávez
mentioned the opposition directly by using movementist discourse in nine of them. On Article
#20 (section II), for example, Chávez referred to the opposition as “that thing they call
‘opposition.’”9 In that same paragraph, the president said the opposition was ready to betray the
homeland, and for that reason, it had to be “swept” in the legislative elections of September
(Lineas de Chávez, August 1, 2010). On Article #45 (Section II), Chávez also disregarded the
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Quotations on the word opposition are found in the original article in Spanish.
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opposition as legitimate political adversaries by calling them oligarchs, unpatriotic, irrational,
destabilizing, and irresponsible criminals. Moreover, he also threatened the opposition by saying
that “the people, the government, and the Bolivarian Armed Forces (the military), in indivisible
unity, are ready to defend it [the state]” (Lineas de Chávez, January 31 2010). Another example
of movementist discourse employed repeatedly by President Chávez in his columns is the
political slogan “Patria Socialista o Muerte,” or “Socialist Homeland or Death.”
After examining the twelve articles that Chávez wrote, it is clear that the Bolivarian
Revolution employs movementist discourse constantly. Nine out of twelve articles contained this
type of discourse. However, it is important to note that Chávez’s movementist discourse is
exclusive to the type of movementist discourse that disregards political opponents. The other
kind, which refers to the disregard of electoral processes as the unique way of attaining power is
nonexistent in Chávez’s discourse. In fact, even though campaign periods were excluded in this
study, Chávez often attempted to motivate his followers to vote and win elections. (See
Appendix I for full list of articles examined)
PSUV Vote Share in the National Assembly
The first constitutional period in the National Assembly was from 2000 until 2005. Prior
to the National Assembly, Venezuela had a bicameral congress with a Senate and a Chamber of
Deputies. As has been discussed, the legislature in the Punto Fijo system played a minimum role
in policy making, a fact that led to the dissolution of Congress once Chávez became president
and the popular approval of the creation of a new constituent body to frame a new constitution.
In this constitution, the National Congress became the National Assembly, a unicameral body
with far more power than Congress had in the past. As changes to the constitution were proposed
and approved by the Venezuelan people in an election with very low turnout, the National
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Assembly was elected, and its first composition would be 115 deputies that would be identified
as proBolivarian and 50 deputies as antiBolivarian. It must be noted that a few parties which
are now very active in the opposition as Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Time) and Proyecto
Venezuela were part of this coalition for a short period of time. After the creation of new parties
due to division in the proChávez groups, the National Assembly’s first constitutional period
culminated with a very different deputy composition. By the time new elections had to be called,
the proChávez group of deputies that denominated themselves the Block for Change had
reduced its composition from 115 to 83 deputies. The opposition block that was called the Block
for Legislative Autonomy, however, had increased its composition from 50 deputies to 82
deputies. These numbers represent a total loss of 32 deputies for the Bolivarian Revolution.
The next legislative period in Venezuela was a very peculiar period because the
opposition decided to boycott the elections claiming that the elections in Venezuela were
fraudulent, a claim they had already made in 2004 when Chávez won the recall referendum. The
refusal to participate obviously resulted in an entirely proChávez National Assembly. Although
not all the deputies elected were from the same official party, which was the MVR at that time,
all deputies were in favor of the Bolivarian Revolution. This would change once proposals for a
single, unified socialist party were made. This new party would replace the MVR (Fifth Republic
Movement) to become a much larger organization covering a wider array of different groups.
Some parties did not adhere to the new party called the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
(PSUV), but remained loyal to the Revolution, while others distanced themselves completely
from the movement like the party PODEMOS (For Social Democracy). Again, due to interparty
ideological divisions and intraparty conflict, a total of 19 deputies had left the Bolivarian
Revolution by 2010. In this case, the Revolution reduced its composition from 167 deputies to
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148. The opposition, which wasn’t represented at all due to its decision to boycott the electoral
process, now had a total of 19 deputies voting against the Revolution.
Realizing that boycotting elections was a mistake, the opposition in Venezuela decided to
actively participate in the 2010 legislative elections. In most instances, they were also unified by
using one candidate per district. This strategy turned out to be very positive for the opposition as
they were able to break both the 2/3 and the 3/5 majority that the PSUV had in the previous
legislative period. The new National Assembly had 98 deputies who supported the Bolivarian
Revolution and 67 who didn’t. As with previous legislative periods, this number has suffered
several changes. Due to the impasse that the governor of Monagas and the PSUV had over a state
policy, Governor Briceno and three deputies from his state formed a new party that is now anti
Chávez. However, three deputies from the opposition also changed their ideologies to join the
proChávez block in the assembly, which, so far, leaves the legislative body with the same
number of deputies in each block (See Appendix II).
Bypass of the Electoral Framework
On the “Anteproyecto de la reforma constitucional presentado por el presidente de la
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías,” President Chávez presented
his official proposal to reform the constitution. This part of the study has found that many
aspects of his proposal are now laws in the Venezuelan republic even though these same
proposals were rejected by the Venezuelan people in the referendum of 2007. On the
“Anteproyecto,” President Chávez proposed to amend articles 328 and 329 of the constitution to
change the name of the National Armed Forces into the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (36).
On the constitution of 1999, these articles presented the National Armed forces as “an essentially
professional institution without political militancy.” The reform in 2007 attempted to change that
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aspect to not only change the name, but also make the National Armed Forces “a body
essentially patriotic, of the people, and antiimperialistic.” Although the articles are not formally
amended, President Chávez did use his decree powers to legislate in favor of his own proposal in
July 31, 2008. Decree Law 6.239 changed the name of the armed forces, and mentions that the
purpose of defending the state must be understood to be the defense of the Bolivarian, social
state that Venezuelans are transitioning into (Gaceta Oficial 5.891).
On June 3, 2008, President Chávez signed Decree Law 6.130 that established the creation
of different socioeconomic organizations following the “socialist model” (Gaceta Oficial 5.890).
This creation is to be administered and sustained centrally by the federal government. This law
had also been proposed by President Chávez in his “Anteproyecto.” Article 300 of the 1999
constitution stipulated that the federal government was responsible for creating laws that
regulated and ensured the social and economic productivity of the “decentralized entities,” which
referred to private actors. In the 2007 referendum, President Chávez proposed the modification
of this article by eliminating the word “decentralized,” and by making the federal government
responsible for creating laws and regulations “under the principles of a socialist economy” (30).
Another example of the laws that were rejected by the people on a national election and
then reintroduced by President Chávez through decree laws is in regards to the Federal
Government Council. The concept was introduced in the 1999 constitution as an entity that
sought to transform Venezuela into a federal republic in practice. In 2007, President Chávez
attempted to change the concept in its entirety by changing the name of the entity to the National
Government Council. It was to ensure that states and municipalities followed national, central
planning (Chávez Frías 25). On July 15, 2008, Decree Law 6217 allowed the president to do
exactly that (Gaceta Oficial 5.890). The president, according to this decree, can now appoint
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officials and regional authorities to implement the policies that are in accordance with national
planning, a role that may interfere with the role of the governor and the mayor (BrewerCarias
332).
Other decree laws have presumed connections with the proposed constitutional
amendments in 2007. The right to housing and the reduction of the working days, for example,
may be other laws that were applied disregarding the 2007 referendum. However, it is much
more difficult to trace the reintroduction back to the president because the National Assembly,
overwhelmingly chavista at the time, played the largest role in the reintroduction. (BrewerCarias
336). Although the rest of the reforms have been reintroduced by different means, the three
examples provided show a clear involvement of President Chávez in both the reform and the
reintroduction processes. Most importantly, the three examples provided in this part of the study
represent very important institutional changes that have indeed affected the dynamics of power
in the country.
Research Question
After examining three different characteristics of movementism, it is clear that the
Bolivarian Revolution has not routinized. President Chávez, while presiding the country, had an
intensively movementist discourse even off campaign periods. His disregard for the opposition
as a legitimate political actor and his desire to maintain full and permanent control of the state
are shown in the columns that were examined. No volverán, or “they will not be back [in
power]” is one of the famous slogans Chavismo continues to use to this day even as the
opposition becomes a powerful political alternative. However, the PSUV does seem to view
elections as the primary route to governing, which is one of the main aspects of an
institutionalized party in both Mainwaring and McGuire’s assessments of movementism. As it
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was discussed, President Chávez was emphatic in his discourse about the need to win elections.
On the other, the political unity that PSUV deputies seem to have once they’re elected continues
to be susceptible to change although, as it was shown, the number of deputies that have switched
sides has been decreasing dramatically. This does show that the Bolivarian Revolution is no
longer the movement it was when Chávez was first elected into office in 1999. However, the
problem of switching political sides is still present. Finally, it has been shown that President
Chávez has indeed used his habilitantes, or decree laws, to legislate and approve reforms that
were rejected by the people in the 2007 referendum. While a precise number to specify how
many decree laws bypassed the will of the people was not obtained, the three decree laws shown
are among the most controversial due to their ability to significantly alter the functioning of the
republic. After examining the three variables in this study, the Bolivarian Revolution and the
PSUV have not routinized or become institutional political parties independent of political
leaders.
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis I had set established that the aspects of movementism found in the
PSUV and in the Bolivarian Revolution in general are enough factors to disqualify the political
system as an institutionalized one. While the decreasing number of deputies switching political
sides suggests there is stronger political unity in the National Assembly, the Bolivarian
Revolution has violated one of its main goals by bypassing the electoral framework. El proceso,
as it has been discussed, seeks to transform Venezuelan representative democracy into
participatory democracy. This means that the people, through several different means but
especially via plebiscitary elections, have the last say. President Chávez violated both the
principles of participatory and electoral democracy by using his decree powers to legislate in
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regards to crucial matters that had been rejected by the people. I consider that this sole reason is
important enough to disqualify the Bolivarian Revolution as an institutionalized way of
governing.
Hypothesis two, however, suggests that the Bolivarian Revolution may be a system in
transition. Looking at the important decreases in PSUV’s vote share in the National Assembly, it
can be said that the revolution has not stalled as a movement. Although its disregard of the will
of the people may impede the qualification of an institutionalized system lead by an
institutionalized political party, the Bolivarian Revolution has indeed evolved from the political
movement it was more than twenty years ago. Efforts to institutionalize the party in recent years
have been important and should not be taken for granted. In this sense, both hypotheses were
supported in my study. The Bolivarian Revolution cannot be described as an institutional
political system since it has not fully routinized. Moreover, its movementist aspect of bypassing
the electoral framework it had established itself in regards to important national transformations
is a factor that can disqualify the political system as an institutionalized one. However, the
revolution has had positive results in attempting to become an institutionalized system in recent
years, which can be seen in the decrease of political shifts in PSUV’s elected officials. The
Bolivarian Revolution and the PSUV form a system in transition that is no longer a movement,
yet it cannot be considered fully institutionalized either due to important violations of the
principles of both electoral and participatory democracy.

DISCUSSION
My study has focused on the aspects that make the Bolivarian Revolution a system that
lacks institutionalization from the side of the proChávez groups, i.e. the PSUV. However, there
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are other major actors that form part of the system by opposing it. In other words, the opposition
in Venezuela is also a part of the Bolivarian Revolution not because it wants to, but because it
has to adhere to the Bolivarian rules of the political game if it wants to gain control of the nation.
This acceptance of the Bolivarian framework on the part of the opposition has not always
dominated the faction, however. At the beginning of President Chávez’s first term, the elites in
Caracas attempted to coopt and negotiate with him to maintain control of state resources. As
President Chávez rejected the proposals made by these sectors, the elite grew increasingly hostile
towards President Chávez, waging a war in the media to disqualify him as a democrat. After
attempting to change public opinion from the media, the opposition then began to persuade the
military to oust him in 2002. Once the coup d’état had consummated, the opposition put itself in
power, sought to arrest the chavistas that had been in power, and restored much of the latifundio
practices that had begun to change (Dominguez 118). Most importantly, the opposition abolished
the constitution that had been approved by the people two years before. Once Chávez took back
the presidency two days later, the opposition continued to attack his government by calling for an
oil strike that paralyzed the country, and then by attempting to recall him in the 2004
referendum. All of these attempts failed, and Chávez was victorious as his regime strengthened
(McCoy 88). As has been discussed, the opposition did not participate in the 2005 legislative
elections, which resulted in a National Assembly that supported President Chávez in its totality.
In conclusion, the opposition was heavily antidemocratic throughout Chávez’s first presidential
term. Instead of accepting the democratic rules, the opposition spent the first five or six years
engaging in causing chaos “through a national wave of unrest and confrontation” (Dominguez
125). Although President Chávez announced more coup attempts and assassination plots in the
late 2000s, the opposition had begun to change strategies, which has had very positive outcomes
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for them in more recent elections. Yet, just as Chávez’s party seems to struggle with
institutionalization, the opposition has engaged in extreme movementist behavior as a way of
attaining power too. Ignoring elections and engaging in actions such as the coup in 2002, it is
clear that the opposition also evolved from Puntofijismo into a political movement. Recalling
from the results section, where it was noted that deputies that represented the opposition have
also switched political sides, it should be said that the opposition also continues to struggle to
become an institutionalized faction of society. Touching upon this point is very important since
one of my study’s focuses was the way upon which Chávez viewed the opposition. The results
from examining his Bolivarian discourse showed that he did not regard the opposition segment
of society as a legitimate one, which was consistent with movementism. However, it is important
to pose the following question: Could have Chávez regarded the opposition any differently after
the many attempts they made to oust him? My initial answer is that he couldn’t. Yet, the
opposition, very much like the chavismo, has had important changes in the last few years. In
2010, they participated in the legislative election, which broke the absolute majority that the
PSUV had had. And in 2012, they backed a single candidate that was able to get 44% of the vote
against Chávez’s 55% and accepted the defeat. However, these efforts towards
institutionalization may have suffered a setback in the April 2013 presidential elections when
opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski refused to recognize the results because of a
very narrow defeat. Yet, as the recount proposal was accepted by the National Electoral Council
very recently at the time of writing, it is difficult to know at this point whether Capriles was
exercising his right to audit the results or if he was simply sabotaging democracy.
Other considerations in regards to the extent to which the political shifts in elected
officials have affected Chavismo should be mentioned. Beyond the National Assembly, three
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governors have switched to the opposition after being elected as PSUV candidates in 2008.
These are the governor of Monagas, Amazonas, and Lara. Among these three, the governor of
Lara, one of the most populous states, has become a very popular political actor in the
opposition. In the April 2013 election, for example, Governor Henri Falcón of Lara was the
director of Capriles’ campaign. In order to stop these switches, the PSUV approved a law in the
previous legislative session called the Ley Antitalanquera. This law sanctions the deputies in the
National Assembly who show signs of a “political or ideological change” in their positions since
they were elected by suspending them. Some of these signs include voting with the contrary
political force (Flores Art 30). The process of suspending a deputy due to a political shift,
however, has to be initiated by either citizens or a deputy within the same political force that the
deputy is expected to represent (Flores Art 31). As the PSUV has recently benefited from the
switches made on the side of the opposition at the National Assembly, the process has not been
initiated.
These considerations in regards to the opposition are very important because they explain
the context in which Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution has developed. Under such a hostile
context, it may have been impossible for Chávez’s party to institutionalize when the system had
to fight the lack of institutionalism that the other major political actors had. Although this is an
important point that may justify President Chávez’s discourse, I do not believe it justifies the
bypassing of the electoral framework when one of the main pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution
is participatory democracy.
Other violations of the model of participatory democracy are less obvious, but may also
represent bypasses of the electoral framework nonetheless. In the 2008 regional elections,
opposition candidate Antonio Ledezma won the election in the Capital District of Caracas,
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making him the most important mayor in the country. Shortly after his victory, President Chávez
announced that he had assigned Jacqueline Faría to fill the post of Chief of Government of the
Capital District, a newly created position by him under Decree Law 6217. The creation of this
post reduced the functions of the mayor in number and gave less autonomy to Caracas from the
federal government. Finally, during the lame duck period of the last National Assembly, after it
was known that the opposition had broken both the 2/3 and 3/5 majorities of the PSUV, the
legislature approved over 26 laws that have been traced back to the constitutional reform of
2007. One of these is the Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National
Determination, which prohibits the foreign finance of national political parties.10 Also during this
lame duck session, another habilitante, or power to rule by decree was given to Chávez for a
period of eighteen months.

CONCLUSION
The Bolivarian Revolution suffers from movementism on both sides of the equation.
Both the opposition via the Democratic Unity Coalition (MUD) and the government via the
PSUV lack a necessary level of institutionalism that can guarantee the stability of the country.
While the hegemonic government of President Chávez ensured stability because of his enormous
popularity, the political game in Venezuela has changed now that he’s dead. On April 14, 2013,
the Chavismo faced its biggest setback since President Chávez won the 1998 elections. Nicolás
Maduro, the successor Chávez had named, won the presidential election with a difference of less
than 2 percentage points, or a couple hundred thousand votes.11 Although the first read of the

10

“En dos semanas la AN aprobó la reforma rechazada en 2007” El Universal. 26 December, 2010.
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National Electoral Council (CNE) www.cne.gob.ve
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election should be that Chavismo without Chávez is possible, the fact that Henrique Capriles
Radonski was able to appeal to many more voters than he had had just five months before may
be a reflection of the weakness of Chavismo without Chávez. With the instability that the
upcoming audit of the elections brought to the country and the several economic problems
Venezuela is facing today, the Bolivarian chapter in Venezuelan history is not over. Now, the
Bolivarian Revolution will attempt to recover the political capital it had just five months ago
when President Chávez won handedly. The setback the revolution suffered may be due to
movement politics and dependence upon Hugo Chávez, or it may also be due to a poor choice of
candidate/successor by President Chávez. Economic and social problems, too, could have
enabled the opposition forces to become statistically just as large as the government forces. The
causes of the setback may have been many, but what can’t be disputed is the fact that Venezuela
had an important political transformation in favor of the opposition just two months after the
death of President Chávez. Moreover, the Bolivarian Revolution has also become increasingly
unstable after the election as the opposition and the national administration refuse to engage in
civilized dialogue.12

12
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APPENDIX I
BOLIVARIAN DICOURSE
ARTICLE NUMBER

DATE

TYPE OF DISCOURSE

Article 6

5 December 2010

MOVEMENTIST

Article 20

1 August 2010

MOVEMENTIST

Article 28

29 May 2010

MOVEMENTIST

Article 30

16 May 2010

MOVEMENTIST

Article 44

7 February 2010

MOVEMENTIST

Article 45

31 January 2010

MOVEMENTIST

Article 51

18 December 2009

NEUTRAL

Article 59

1 November 2009

MOVEMENTIST

Article 65

20 September 2009

NEUTRAL

Article 67

6 September 2009

MOVEMENTIST

Article 70

16 August 2009

MOVEMENTIST

Article 79

14 June 2009

NEUTRAL
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APPENDIX II
PSUV VOTE SHARE IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

NUMBER OF DEPUTIES
CHANGE FOR CHAVISMO

20002005

32

NUMBER OF DEPUTIES
CHANGE FOR THE
OPPOSITION
+32

20062011

19

+19

20112016

3

3
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